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NUMBER VIII
THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL WAR
IN PRODUCING STANDING ARMIES AND OTHER
INSTITUTIONS UNFRIENDLY TO LIBERTY
Assuming that it is the truth that the several States, in the case we don’t unite, or what ever combination results from the wreck of the Confederacy, would be subject to alterations of peace and war, and friendship and malevolence, which is what has happened to all of neighboring nations that are not united under one government, let us discuss some of the consequences that would follow such a situation.
Any war between the States, soon after they were to separate, would involve many more problems than you normally see in countries that have an established military. The disciplined armies that are kept at the ready in Europe, though they can be perceived as a threat to the concepts of liberty and economy, are nonetheless advantageous in discouraging sudden conquests by others and of preventing the quick desolation caused by war that might have occurred had the troops not been present. The art of fortification has the same effect. The nations of Europe are guarded by fortifications which block invasion. Military campaigns are squandered just from attempts to penetrate one of two frontier garrisons. Similar impediments occur regularly to exhaust the strength of and delay the progress of the enemy. It used to be that an invading army could penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country as quickly as it would take for that country to learn that the invasion was occurring. Now, however, a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting defensively, using assigned positions, is able to slow and even end the attempts of a more considerable force. The history of war in Europe is not a history of nations subdued or empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken, of battles that decide nothing, of retreats that were more beneficial than victories, of much effort and little gain.
In this country, however, the opposite would occur. The distrust of military establishments would postpone their development. The lack of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one State vulnerable to another, would facilitate invasion. The more heavily populated States would defeat the less populated States with very little difficulty. Conquests would be as easy to create and difficult to keep. Therefore, war would become haphazard and predatory. Plunder and devastation always follow this sort of chaos. The disasters suffered by individuals would become the focus that would define our military exploits.
The situation I describe is not too dreadfully constructed, although I confess, it would not long remain a fitting description. Safety from the dangers posed by others is the most powerful influence on national behavior. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to what liberty requires. The destruction of life and property that comes with war, the constant effort and alarm that come with being in a state of continual danger, will compel the nations that most value liberty to turn to, for peace and security, organizations that have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be safer, they are willing to run the risk of being less free.
The organizations that I mainly refer to are standing armies and the corresponding extensions of military establishments. Standing armies are not prohibited by the new Constitution and it is therefore said that they may exist under it. This inference is at best questionable and uncertain.* But the argument is that standing armies are destined to result from the dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war or constant worry about war will require a constant state of preparation which will naturally result in the existence of standing armies. The weaker States, or confederacies, would first have standing armies to equal themselves with more formidable neighbors. They would try to make up for a smaller population and fewer resources with a organized system of defense, by disciplined troops and by fortifications. The weaker States or confederacies would also have to strengthen the executive branch of government and in doing so they encourage development of an eventual monarchy. It is the nature of war to increase the power of the executive branch at the expense of the legislative branch.
The opportunities that I have mentioned would give the States or confederacies that use them an advantage over their neighbors. When they have a stronger government and a disciplined army, smaller States or those less fortified have often prevailed over stronger states which have not had the same advantages. The pride and safety of larger States would not permit them to submit to the humiliation of the natural superiority of the smaller State. Rather, they larger States would quickly try to attain the same status so they could regain their own predominant status. We would quickly see established in every part of this country the same scourge of tyranny that we saw in Europe. This is the very least that could happen, and we should adjust our assumptions according to this line of reasoning.
These are not vague conclusions drawn from supposed or speculative defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in a people or their representatives or delegates. They are solid conclusions, drawn as a natural result regarding the progress of human affairs.
As a way of objecting to what I have said, we might ask, why did standing armies not spring up out of the conflicts that so preoccupied the ancient Greek republics? There are different but equally satisfactory answers to this question. The habits of busy modern people that keep them engaged in pursuits of gain, including improvements to agriculture and commerce, are inconsistent with the habits of a nation of soldiers like the Greek republics. Because of modernization, wealth has increased due to increase in gold and silver and due to improvements in the arts of industry and the science of finance. This has changed the nature of the issue of war, which makes disciplined armies, separate from the citizenry, a constant companion of frequent conflicts.
There is a huge difference between militaries in countries hardly ever exposed to the constant threat of internal invasions and those which are often subject to them and therefore always worried about them. There’s really no good reason for the countries rarely exposed to hostilities to keep available armies, when there is a good reason for vulnerable countries to have them. In countries that are rarely subject to attack, the armies are rarely called to duty to defend their territory, and therefore the people in that country aren’t as much at risk of having to subject themselves to military rule. Civil society remains intact because the laws aren’t subject to accommodating military crises, and the laws therefore remain uncorrupted and uncomplicated by the practices or principles of the other state. The small size of the army means that the community will naturally be a stronger force, and the citizenry is therefore not forced to depend on the military for protection nor submit to their tyranny. It follows from this that the citizenry neither love not fear their military, but rather view the military with suspicious compliance as a necessary evil, one as a power they stand ready to resist should military do anything which might threaten their individual rights.
An army when necessary may usefully aid public officials in putting down a riot or occasional mob or uprising, but it will be unable to stop the united efforts of the great body of people.
In a country that is frequently threatened with aggression from another, the contrary of all of this happens. The constant threat of hostilities require the government to always be prepared to repel it, and it’s armies have to always have enough trained fighters that can be called for immediate defense. The constant need for their protection elevates the importance of the soldier, and coincidentally degrades the importance of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil state. The inhabitants in these countries are consequently subject to frequent infringements of their rights, which cause them to be less aware or conscientious about their rights, and by degrees the people come to believe that the soldiers are not only their protectors but also their superiors. This transition to considering the military as the master is possible and not difficult; but it will be difficult to convince the people who are suffering under these impressions to make a bold and effective resistance to infringements upon them by the government that is supported by the military.
The kingdom of Great Britain falls within this description. They are in an isolated situation, with a powerful navy, guarding them against foreign invasion, replacing the need for a large army within the kingdom itself. A sufficient force to have ready against a sudden attack, until the militia have time to rally and organize, is all that is considered necessary. No foreign policy issue has required, and public opinion would not tolerate, a larger number of domestic troops. There has been for a long time little room for the other causes I have mentioned that often lead to internal war. This strangely happy situation has greatly contributed to preserving the liberty which that country enjoys today, in spite of the regular propensity towards bribery and corruption. If Britain had been located on the European continent, rather than an island, she would have been forced to build her military up comparably with the other European countries, and that would probably have lead her to be the victim of the power of a single man. It is possible, but not easy, that the people of that island could be enslaved from other things, but it won’t be because of a military the size of which has normally been established within the kingdom.
This is not a superficial or impossible idea, but rather trustworthy and important. It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and honest man of any party. If such men will take a firm and solemn pause and think calmly about the importance of this interesting idea; if they will consider this issue in all of its approaches, and logically consider all of the possible consequences of these situations, they will easily part with trivial objections to the Constitution, the rejection of which will in all probability put a final end to the Union. The airy phantoms which flit before the afflicted imaginations of the opponents to the Constitution would give way instead to the more probable prospects of dangers, real, certain and terrible.
PUBLIUS [Hamilton]
*This objection will be further explored later at the proper time, and it will be shown that the only proper precaution which could have been taken on this subject has been taken, and it’s a much better one than has been proposed in any other draft of a constitution that has been framed in American, most of which have not caution at all on this subject.