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NUMBER IX
THE UTILITY OF THE UNION
AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC
FACTION AND INSURRECTION
A solid Union will be of the utmost importance to the peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic quarrels or insurrections. It is impossible to read the history of the small republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the disturbances with which they were constantly rocked, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a constant state of instability between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If there were occasional calms, they were short in duration before being interrupted by the next furious storm of upheaval. If now and then periods of peace occurred, they are viewed with a mixture of regret, knowing that soon that peace will be upset by yet more violent waves of treason and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a brief and fleeting brilliance, they at the same time caution us to mourn that the vices of government will twist the direction and tarnish the luster of those bright, talented individuals and celebrated efforts for which the blessed countries which produced them have been so rightly distinguished.
Advocates of despotism have drawn on the history of those republics as a basis for their arguments against not only republican government, but the principles of civil liberty as well. They condemn all free government as inconsistent with an orderly society, and they indulge in spiteful triumph over those that support that concept. Happily for mankind, there have been remarkable structures formed on the basis of liberty throughout history that provide magnificent examples that refute their gloomy reasoning. And I trust that America will be the solid influence for the growth of other structures, equally magnificent, which will also stand as permanent monuments to their incorrect assumptions.
It is true that the portraits that the detractors have sketched of republic governments were just copies of the originals. If it is true that republican government can not be developed into a more perfect model, the enlightened friends of liberty would then be required to abandon the idea of that sort of government. But the science of politics, like most other sciences, has over time improved. The effectiveness of various principles that were not known, or not well known, to the ancients are now well understood. The distribution of power into distinct departments; the principle of legislative checks and balances; the creation of courts where judges hold their positions as long as demonstrate good behavior; the representation of the people in legislatures by representatives of their own choosing; these are either wholly new discoveries or mechanisms that have been perfected more recently. They are powerful means by which the positive aspects of republican government can be made to last while the negative aspects can be avoided. To the list of instances that tend to improve popular systems of civil government I would add, even though it might seem novel, one more that stems from the objections to the new Constitution: I mean the enlargement of the orbit within which these types of systems tend to revolve, either in the context of a single State or in the context of several States operating in a Confederacy. The Confederacy is one of the immediate concerns, although it will also be useful to examine this in the context of a single State, so I will discuss that later.
The usefulness of a Confederacy as a means of suppressing rebellion and to protect internal peace is not a new idea. It’s been practiced in various countries throughout history and has received the approval of some of the most notable political writers. The opponents of the Constitution have with steadfast attention brought up the opinion of Montesquieu* regarding the necessity of having a limited territory for a republican government. But they don’t seem to know about some of the other sentiments of that great man that he expressed in different parts of his work, nor do they seem to consider the results of their own assertions that they so readily accept.
When Montesquieu recommends a small territory for republics, the standards he had in mind were of proportions far short of the limits of every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models which he considered and described. If we therefore take his ideas on this point as the standard of truth, we’ll be forced to into either seeking shelter in the arms of monarchy or of splitting ourselves into an endless future of little, jealous, clashing, turbulent commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unending quarrels and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who support the other side seem to be aware of the problem, and have even been so bold as to hint that the division of the larger States is a good thing. Such an attractive policy, such a desperate opportunity, of multiplying therefore the many political offices available to men, might work for men who don’t possess enough qualifications to extend their influence more broadly, but it will never promote the greatness or happiness of the American people.
While examination of the issue itself will be reserved for a later time, as has already been mentioned, it will be good enough for now to state that, referring to the author who has been most forcefully quoted regarding this issue, it would only require a reduction of the size of the larger members of the Union, but it would not have a major effect on their all being put together under one confederate government. And this is the true question in which we are currently interested.
The suggestions that Montesquieu was opposed to a general Union of States are wrong, and in fact, he clearly treats a Confederate Republic as the means for extending the influence of popular government and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.
“It is very probable” (says he**) “that mankind would have been bound for a long time to live constantly under a government ruled by a single person had mankind not worked to develop a kind of constitution that has all of the internal benefits of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchy. I mean a Confederate Republic.
“This form of government is organized where several smaller states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of gathering of societies that will constitute a new one, able to increase by means of new states joining, until they are strong enough to be able to provide security for the whole united body.
“A republic of this kind, that is strong enough to withstand an external threat, can support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all kinds of discomfort.
“If a single member should attempt to seize the supreme authority, he couldn’t be considered to have equal authority and influence in all of the other confederate states. Were he to have too much influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue one part, those that remain free might oppose him with forces separate from those he seized, and overpower him before he could make this power permanent.
“Should a popular uprising happen in one of the confederate states, the others will be able to subdue it. Should abuses creep into one part, they can be reconciled by the others who are not corrupted. The state may be destroyed on one side and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved and the confederates can still retain their sovereignty.
“As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each, and with respect to its external situation, by means of association between the states, it has all of the advantages of large monarchies.”
I thought I was proper to quote fully these interesting passages, because they contain a clear outline of the principle arguments in favor of the Union. These passages must effectively remove the false impressions one might get about this form of government just because of failed experiences with it in other parts of the world. Quoting Montesquieu also has a more direct connection with the purpose of this paper, which is to show the tendency of the Union to prevent domestic upheaval and disagreement.
A subtle and not quite accurate distinction has been brought up regarding the difference between a confederacy and a consolidation of the States. The main characteristic of a confederacy is that power is restricted to the members collectively, without reaching to the individuals of which they are composed. It’s been argued that the national council should not have any concern with any instance of internal administration. An exact equality of political suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a leading characteristic of a confederate government. These positions are mainly unreasonable; they are not supported by principle or past experience. Experience shows that governments of this kind generally operate in the manner which is considered inherent in their nature; but there have been in most of these governments many exceptions to the practice, which serves to prove by example that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And in the course of this investigation it will be clearly shown that, as far as the principle argued for has survived, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and stupidity in the government.
The definition of a confederate republic seems simple to be “an assemblage of societies,” or an association of two or more states into one state. The extent, changes, or items of federal authority are only matters of choice. So long as the separate organization of the members remains intact; as long as it exists by constitutional necessity for local purposes; although it should remain completely secondary to the general power of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution does not consider the end of the State governments, but rather makes them members of the national sovereignty by direct representation in the Senate, leaving in their possession certain singular and very important portions of sovereign power. In every rational sense, this fully conforms to the idea of a federal government.
In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three cities, or republics, the largest were entitled to three votes in the common council, the middle class were allowed two votes, and the lowest class one. The common council had the appointment of all of the judges and magistrates of the respective cities. This was surely the touchiest instance of interference in their internal administration, because if there is anything that should be completely given to the local jurisdictions, it should be the choosing of its own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association, said “[w]ere I to give a model of an excellent Confederate republic, it would be that of Lycia.” So we perceive that the differences insisted upon were not within the thinking of this informed civilian, and we shall be led to conclude that they are the unique clarifications of a mistaken theory.
PUBLIUS [Hamilton]
*Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu (1689-1755) French historian and political theorist, who wrote Esprit des Lois (“Spirit of Laws”) in 1748.
**Spirit of Laws, Vol. 1, Book IX, Chapter I.
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