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NUMBER X
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED
Among the many benefits promised by well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more truthfully described than its tendency to resist and control the violence of rebellion. The friend of popular governments never worries about the character and fate of them so much as when he considers their tendency to the dangerous habit of rebellion. So he will consider any proposals which provide a cure for this tendency, as long as they do not breach the basic principles he believes in. The instability, injustice, and confusion that public councils have succumbed to have truthfully been the deadly sicknesses under which popular governments everywhere have perished, and this fact has been used by the opponents of liberty as a means by which they can assert their most misleading claims. One can’t admire enough the valuable improvements that have been made by the American Constitution on both the ancient and modern popular models. But it would improper favoritism to claim that these improvements have prevented the danger of rebellion, even though we wish it or expect it. Our most concerned and worthy citizen, supporters of private faith and personal liberty, complain that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is ignored by those who are lost in party rivalries. They complain that issues are too often decided by the superior force of an prejudiced and overbearing majority parties rather than pursuant to justice and consideration for the rights of the minority. We might wish these concerns to not exist, but the evidence shows that in some degree, they are true. In clearly reviewing our situation, we can see that some of the worries that we have been wrongly blamed on the way our governments work. Yet at the same time, we will see that we can’t necessarily blame our worst problems on other causes. I refer mainly to the constant and increasing distrust of public affairs while at the same time there is alarm concerning private rights and we hear these concerns echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These concerns follow directly from the lack of stability and injustice that have created the divisive atmosphere which has corrupted the current administration.
These divisions amount to a number of citizens, being a majority or minority, who band together pursuant to a common impulse or interest, and this impulse or interest conflicts with the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and combined interests of the community.
There are two ways to fixing the problems of division: first, by removing its causes, and second, by controlling its effects.
And there are two ways of stopping the causes of division: first, by destroying the liberty which is necessary to its existence, and second, by having all citizens have the same opinions, passions and interests.
It can be truly said that the first remedy is worse than the disease. Liberty is to division like air is to fire, and without liberty, division instantly ends. It would be just as wrong to abolish liberty, which is necessary for political life, just because it also encourages divisions. This would be as wrong as wishing for the abolishment of air, which is necessary for life, just because it also gives life to the occasional destructive fire.
The second remedy is not practical any more than the first remedy is wise. As long as the reasoning of men is imperfect, and yet he is at liberty to exercise it anyway, differences of opinion will happen. As long as there is a connection between his reason and his self-interest, his opinions and his passions will have a mirror effect on each other, and his reason will be an object to which his self-interest attaches. The abilities of men differ, which leads to differences in status, also leads to diversity of interests. The protection and nurturing of these abilities should be the first priority of government. When the government protects differing abilities, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results, and from this springs a dividing up of society into different interests and parties.
The hidden causes of division are therefore natural to man; and we see the differing interests manifest themselves in different activities according to the varying circumstances in the community. Men possess differing eagerness for many things: religion, government, etc, regarding both the subject and the means of practice. Men also form an attachment to different leaders who are ambitiously vying for power and prestige, or to others whose situation has caught the public eye. This in turn has divided mankind into parties, provoking them to with mutual hatred and encouraged them to irritate and oppress each other than to cooperate for the common good. The tendency of man towards mutual animosity is so strong that even when no real situation presents itself, then silly and imaginative situations will be enough to create cold relations and provoked violent conflicts. But the most common and lasting source of divisions has been the varying and unequal distribution of property. Those who have property and those that don’t, have forever formed into distinct interest groups in society. The same can be said for creditors and debtors. There are men with land, men in manufacturing, those that are wealthy and many more that are not, are a natural part of civilized societies that divide into different classes because of their differing interests. The regulation of these differing interests is one of the main jobs of modern legislation and it involves the spirit of party and division that is an ordinary part of the functions of government.
Men cannot be judges in their own cases because their self-interests would bias their judgment and probably also corrupt their character. It follows with even greater reasoning that a group of men are not fit to be both judges and parties at the same time. Even so, isn’t it true that the most important acts of legislation and the most important legal decisions really about, not just the rights of single persons, but the rights of citizenry as a whole? Aren’t different classes of legislators really advocates and parties in the same causes that they make decisions about? What if a law is proposed that deals with private debts? This is a question that has creditors on side and debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet, the parties are and must be the judges and the most numerous and powerful faction will be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufacturers be supportive, and just how much, of restrictions on foreign manufacturers? This is a question that would be decided upon differently between the wealthy and the manufacturing classes, and both would put self-interest above regard for justice and the public good. The dividing up of the tax burden with regards to the different descriptions of property is an act requiring the greatest degree of impartiality, and yet, there is probably no other legislative act more prone to the perversion of justice due to the opportunity and temptation of those developing the law. Every shilling that they can take from the inferior party is an extra shilling saved in their own pockets.
It is a waste of time to say that competent statesmen will be able to tame these differing interests for the better of the public good. Competent statesmen will not always be in control. Plus, in many cases adjustments can’t be made with out considering the indirect and remote circumstances that might result, although these are not likely to effect the immediate interest that one party might have in ignoring the rights of another or the good of the whole in general.
So the conclusion here is that we can’t stop the causes of division but we can try to control its effects.
If a party consists of a minority, a solution comes from the republican principle, which allows the majority to defeat the corrupt intentions of the minority by regular vote. It may impede progress in the administration and it may cause societal disruption, but with the Constitution, it will not result in violence. On the other hand, when the party is a majority, a popular form of government encourages the majority to sacrifice its selfish interests for the good of the public and the rights of other citizens. So the main concern here involves protecting the public good and private rights against the danger of such a coalition while also preserving the spirit and form of popular government. Let me add that it is by great want or need that this form of government can be rescued from the infamy under which it has labored for so long, and can be recommended to the admiration and adoption of mankind.
How can this be done? Apparently, out of two options, only one can be selected. Either the majorities’ common interest must be prevented, or if it exists, there must be a way to prevent them, by number or local means, from using this common interest for the purpose of oppression. If the desire and opportunity occur at the same time, we know that we can’t rely on the religion or morality of the majority to restrain them. Religion or morality are not enough alone to restrain any individual, and when people are combined in numbers, the need for the restraint is more necessary and yet harder to find.
From this point of view we can conclude that in a pure democracy, meaning a society comprised of a small number of citizens who participate in government personally, can find no cure for the mischief caused by factions. The majority will almost always have a common interest, and there is nothing to prevent the desire to sacrifice a weaker party or an obnoxious individual. So it is true that democracies have been forever associated with turbulence and conflict; have forever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights to property; and in general they have been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theorizing politicians who are condescending towards democracy have mistakenly supposed that by making men completely equal in their political rights will also make these men completely equal and matched in their possessions, their opinions, and their interests.
A republic, being a government where there is representation, presents a different option and promises the cure that we need. Let’s examine the points by which a republic differs from pure democracy and then we can understand the nature of the cure which can be derived from the Union.
There are two major differences between a democracy and a republic. First, in a republic, you have a group of individuals who are selected by the rest of the population to represent that population. Second, a republic extends over a greater number of citizens and a great area of country.
The effect of the first difference is that the views of the public can be enlarged and refined through the efforts of a chosen group of representatives who in their wisdom might best understand the true interests of their country, and whose patriotism and love of country would not allow temporary or self-interested considerations to cloud that wisdom. Under this type of order, it may very well be that the representatives will more adequately provide a voice more in tune with the public good than if the people got together to offer their voice instead. On the other hand, you can turn this argument around. Men of divisive personality, who have local prejudices or who might be operating according to wicked plans, may use plots or corruption or some other means by which to obtain votes, and then betray the interests of the people who gave them those votes. So the question is, whether smaller or larger republics are better suited to the election of proper guardians of the public trust. It is clearly decided in favor of larger republics and there are two good reasons for this.
First, it must be said that however small the republic may be, there will have to be enough representatives to prevent control by only a very few. At the same time, however large the republic is, the number of representatives must be limited to a certain number to avoid the confusion that would come with too large a crowd. So if we have in either case a number of representatives that is not in proportion to that of the constituents, the number of good choices for representation will not be any less in the large than in the small republic. Therefore, the large republic is a greater option because there would a greater probability that competent people would be chosen as representatives.
Second, since each representative would be chosen by a greater number of people in a large republic, it would make it more difficult for candidates to engage in the corruption or trickery that are so common to elections. The votes of the people would be freer and would most liked center of me who have the best credentials and established character.
Now I must confess that there is a problem on both sides. By having too many electors, you can separate the representative from their local interests and circumstances. If you reduce the number of electors by too much, then the representative will become too attached to local concerns and will he wil then be less able to deal with national interests. The federal Constitution allows for a balance between these two issues, with the great and united interests being referred to the national level, while the local and particular issues will be handled by the State legislatures.
The other point of view has to deal with the greater number of citizens and the greater extend of territory which may within the sphere of a republican government rather than a democracy. The number of citizens and area of territory are the very things that make divisions or coalitions more dreaded in a republic and they are in a democracy. The smaller the community, the less likely it is that there will be differences in the common interests and parties that make up that community. The fewer the differing interests, the more likely a majority can be found. And the smaller the number found within the majority and the smaller the area in which they are placed, the more likely they will cooperate and successfully execute their oppressive plans. Enlarge the geographical area and you have a greater variety of parties and interests, and you make it less probable that a majority will have a common motive to invade the rights of others, or, if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for those who share the motive to use their strength to act together with each other. Besides other obstacles, I might mention that, where there is a desire to engage in unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always influenced by distrust in proportion to the number of persons whose agreement is necessary.
Therefore, it is clear that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy by controlling the effects of division and party loyalties is better in a larger rather than smaller republic, and is better for the Union over the States that make up the Union. Does this advantage require the appointment of representatives whose enlightened views and honorable opinions keep them above the influence of local prejudices and schemes of injustice? I won’t deny that representatives of the Union will no doubt exhibit these required attributes. Does it consist of the security afforded by a system where a variety of prevents any one party from rising up and oppressing the rest? Along the same lines, does the greater number of parties within the Union increase this security? Ultimately, does it provide more obstacles to the cooperation and fulfillment of the secret wishes of an unjust and prejudiced majority? Here again we see that the Union provides the best advantage.
The influence of leaders who are partial to party loyalties may spark a flame within the States they represent but they won’t be able to start a fire within the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political movement within a part of the Confederacy, but the variety of sects dispersed over the larger geographical area must protect the national councils from any danger from the danger of oppression by a prejudiced majority. A strong desire for paper money, for the cancellation of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less likely to spread through the whole body of the Union than it is to spread through any particular member of it. Likewise, such a sickness would more likely affect a particular county or district than it would an entire state.
Therefore, regarding the extent and structure of the Union, we see a republican remedy for the illness that is most likely characteristic of republican government. According to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republican, this should encourage our zest for cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of federalists.
Publius [Madison]